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1Petri Net Modeling of Cyber-Physical Attacks on
Smart Grid
Thomas M. Chen, Senior Member, IEEE,, Juan Carlos Sanchez-Aarnoutse,
and John Buford, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper investigates the use of Petri nets for mod-
eling coordinated cyber-physical attacks on the smart grid. Petri
nets offer more flexibility and expressiveness than traditional
attack trees to represent the actions of simultaneous attackers.
However, Petri net models for attacks on very large critical
infrastructures such as the smart grid require a great amount of
manual effort and detailed expertise in cyber-physical threats. To
overcome these obstacles, we propose a novel hierarchical method
to construct large Petri nets from a number of smaller Petri
nets that can be created separately by different domain experts.
The construction method is facilitated by a model description
language that enables identical places in different Petri nets to
be matched. The new modeling approach is described for an
example attack on smart meters, and its efficacy is demonstrated
by a proof-of-concept Python program.
Index Terms—Smart grid, cyber-physical systems, coordinated
attack, Petri net.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is envisioned as a modernization of the
aging electrical power system taking advantage of information
and communication technologies for demand response, self-
healing, resilience, and accommodation of distributed energy
generation [1]–[8]. As critical infrastructure, the smart grid is
expected to be a tempting target for hacking, service theft,
sabotage, terrorism, and other malicious attacks [9]. Security
has been widely recognized as a major issue with potentially
catastrophic implications [10]–[15].
The smart grid will be exposed to new risks from network
vulnerabilities as well as inherit existing risks from physical
vulnerabilities in the current power grid [14]. Physical attacks
may disrupt the generation, transmission, and distribution of
power. In addition, vulnerable targets may include advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) components, namely smart me-
ters and access points in the neighborhood area network
(NAN). Cyber attacks may take advantage of accessibility
through the NAN or home area networks (HANs) to attempt to
remotely access, compromise, or control electronic resources.
Traditionally attack modeling has focused on single at-
tacks. However, recent history such as September 11, 2001
has demonstrated that highly motivated, sophisticated groups
are capable of carrying out coordinated attacks on critical
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infrastructure. Coordinated attacks aim for a compounded
effect greater than the sum of its individual attacks. With the
Internet and modern telecommunications, it is now easy for
geographically distributed groups to coordinate simultaneous
attacks.
Current mathematical tools for modeling and analysis of
coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems are not well
developed [16]. Although popular, attack trees are not well
suited to account for simultaneous attackers. In this paper, we
aim to show that Petri nets can be useful for modeling cyber-
physical attacks on the smart grid. Petri nets are well known
tools for studying concurrent processes. However, Petri nets
have serious drawbacks for enormously complex systems such
as the smart grid. First, the resulting Petri net model will be
impractically large and very difficult to create in a single step.
Second, the security analyst responsible for creating the attack
model will need detailed expert knowledge of both cyber and
physical threats.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel Petri net
construction method to overcome these drawbacks. The new
method allows different security domain experts to separately
create smaller “low level” Petri net models. A security analyst
creates a “high level” Petri net model at a level of abstraction
where detailed knowledge of cyber-physical attacks is not
required. The high level Petri net model is then methodically
expanded by incorporating details from the low level Petri nets.
The expansion process is facilitated by a model description
language that allows places and transitions to be defined
uniquely, such that the same places in different Petri nets can
be identified and matched.
We review the relevant literature on attack modeling in
section 2. Section 3 gives an overview of cyber and physical
threats to the smart grid. In section 4, we describe how Petri
nets can model coordinated cyber-physical attacks with an
example drawn from an historical incident, a blackout on
August 14, 2003. In section 5, we present a new model
construction method illustrated with a smart meter example.
In the final section, the efficacy of the model construction
method is demonstrated by a proof-of-concept Python program
implementing the smart meter example.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Attack Trees
Attack models are used frequently in the context of com-
puter networks and power control systems. Traditionally attack
trees have been the most common type of model for rep-
resenting known cyber attacks [17]–[19]. In an attack tree,
2the root of the tree represents the ultimate goal while the
branches show all possible sequences of action steps towards
the goal. An attacker might be imagined proceeding up the
tree, reaching a new sub-goal at each node. Thus, the modeling
approach implemented in an attack tree visualizes an attack as
a hierarchy of sub-goals leading to the ultimate goal. The basic
attack tree may be made more complicated in various ways,
for example, nodes might have associated values or logical
“and/or” conditions [20].
Ten et al. proposed to use attack trees for modeling cyber
intrusions in existing power control systems [21]. Attack trees
were shown to offer a systematic way to identify vulnera-
bilities of SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition)
systems and quantify different vulnerability scenarios.
McLaughlin, Podkuiko and McDaniel presented an attack
tree to illustrate potential ways to commit energy theft in
the smart grid [22]. Their attack tree shows three classes of
attacks, depending on how demand data is tampered with.
Attack trees are a popular modeling approach because
they are good at describing an attack in an intuitive visual
way; show all attack paths within a broad picture; and can
lead to useful mathematical analyses (e.g., risk assessment,
vulnerability analysis) if nodes are assigned values. On the
other hand, attack trees are somewhat limited in their view of
attacks only proceeding in sequential steps. Also, they tend to
focus on vulnerabilities, a single goal, and a single attacker.
In this paper, we are concerned with Petri nets because they
do not have the limitations of attack trees.
B. Petri Nets
Petri nets have been popular models for various types of
asynchronous, concurrent processes. The basic Petri net is
a directed graph consisting of places (or states, drawn as
circles), transitions (i.e., actions, typically bars or boxes), and
directed arcs [23], [24]. Input places point to a transition, and
a transition points to output places. A number of tokens move
around the net from place to place, and the distribution of
tokens among the places (called the marking) represents the
dynamic state of the entire modeled system. Many extensions
to the basic Petri net have been proposed in the literature to
fit specific applications [25]–[27].
The usefulness of Petri nets for cyber attack modeling was
pointed out first perhaps by McDermott as an alternative to
attack trees [28]. It was observed that Petri nets are better at
capturing concurrent actions in the progression of an attack.
Dalton et al. suggested generalized stochastic Petri nets
for cyber attack modeling [29]. Stochastic Petri nets are a
type of timed Petri nets where transitions occur (“fire”) after
random times. In their work, transition delays were assumed
to be exponentially distributed which conveniently turned
the stochastic Petri net into an equivalent continuous-time
Markov chain. The approach appeared to be motivated by
the straightforward steady-state analysis possible for Markov
chains, but the assumption of exponential transition delays was
not clearly justified.
Colored Petri nets have attracted some attention for cyber
attacks because they are more expressive than basic Petri nets.
In the basic Petri net, all tokens are indistinguishable from
each other. In colored Petri nets, tokens carry data values
represented by color which enables different attackers to be
distinguished with separate identities in the model. Wu et al.
suggested colored Petri nets for hierarchical attack modeling
[30]. An attack represented at a high level is a simple colored
Petri net where certain transitions have hidden details. The
hidden details of that transition can be viewed in an associated
subpage which is a separate colored Petri net.
Dahl and Wolthusen suggested the use of interval timed col-
ored Petri nets where tokens carry timestamps as well as color
and the firing delay of transitions are bounded by specified
time intervals [31]. Their concern is timing-dependent attacks
carried out by multiple attackers against possibly multiple
targets.
In the context of the electrical power system, Petri nets
have been used mostly to model interdependencies between the
existing electrical power infrastructure and communications
infrastructure [20], [32], [33]. In these Petri net models, places
represent all possible states of both power and communi-
cation systems, and transitions represent actions that affect
state changes. That is, interdependencies are accounted for in
a straightforward manner by combining both electrical and
communication devices in a single Petri net.
C. Coordinated Attacks
The subject of this paper is the problem of representing
coordinated attacks where multiple attackers are acting in
parallel towards a common goal. The actions of one attacker
may affect another. For example, one attacker could shut
off power to a building, creating an opportunity for another
attacker to physically break in without setting off an alarm.
Both attack trees and Petri nets can be adapted with some
effort to work for coordinated attacks.
Attack trees view an attack as a sequence of “atomic”
actions. For coordinated attacks, one can view the group of
attackers as a single attacker, then atomic actions in the attack
tree consist of the physical or electronic actions of any attacker
in the group. However, the attack tree approach for coordinated
attacks has major drawbacks. Its view is limited to a sequence
of actions directed towards a single ultimate goal, and it can
not really account for simultaneous actions. The number of
possible joint actions increases exponentially with the number
of attackers which increases the size of the attack tree.
Since Petri nets were designed for concurrent processes,
they can account for simultaneous actions of multiple attackers
more naturally. Multiple attackers can be represented in the
usual way with multiple tokens. In some situations, attackers
may be acting in separate Petri nets, but this would mean that
the actions of one attacker are essentially unrelated to another.
Braynov and Jadliwala proposed a “coordinated-attack
graph” where nodes represent system states and arcs depict
actions causing state transitions (as usual) [34]. An action (or
transition) can be executed only if its preconditions are true,
and execution creates specific postconditions. The concepts
are very similar to a Petri net, although they do not call it
a Petri net. They first consider the sequential actions of a
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plan for a group of attackers can be created by the union of
individual plans. A coordinated-attack graph is the union of
all coordinated-attack plans that begin from the same initial
states and reach the same ultimate goal.
In contrast, we address the same problem of coordinated
attacks but our approach is related explicitly to Petri nets.
Braynov and Jadliwala [34] are more concerned with formal
definitions and a method to construct a coordinated-attack
graph by combining the graphs of individual attackers. The
number of attackers makes a difference. Our method aims for
a two-step construction of Petri nets by combining smaller
Petri nets representing the separate cyber and physical do-
mains. The number of interconnected infrastructures affects
the construction method but the number of attackers is not a
factor (attackers are simply represented by tokens). We will
consider an example with two interconnected infrastructures
(namely, cyber and physical) but in principle, the construction
method can work with any number of infrastructures (e.g., gas,
water, transportation) at the cost of additional steps.
III. ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITIES IN THE SMART GRID
In this section, we review the range of physical, cyber,
and combined threats to the smart grid. This will provide the
context for the next section on attack modeling.
A. Physical Threats
The current physical infrastructure of the U.S. electric power
grid consists of three interconnected networks of 152 regional
control areas responsible for reliable transmission of power
from approximately 10,000 central power plants. High voltage
electricity is transmitted along 200,000 miles of transmission
lines to more than 10,000 transmission substations and 2,000
distribution substations, where electricity is stepped down to
medium voltages and distributed to consumers. This system
will evolve into a smart grid, at least initially, with the
introduction of smart (AMI) meters, NANs, and meter data
management systems for demand response.
Physical threats affecting the loss of components might be
viewed in terms of three factors: vulnerability to damage;
impact of the loss on the power system; and readiness of repair
or replacement.
Vulnerability to damage: All components in today’s elec-
trical system are designed to withstand a degree of physical
stress and could be protected better for a cost. Different types
of facilities have varying levels of protection depending on
the proximity to the consumer. Generating stations are fairly
well protected because they are usually manned and guarded.
Access control includes keying systems, access cards, video
surveillance, and perimeter alarms. Less protected substations
are a greater concern. Transmission lines are fairly vulnerable
because they can be sabotaged anywhere along the line or a
transmission tower. Distribution lines can be relatively low and
easy to disrupt.
in the smart grid, smart meters are particularly vulnerable
because they reside at the customer premises. Smart meters
will be equipped with tamper resistance such as security seals,
and internal stored data should be protected by encryption and
tamper-proof electronic circuitry. However, it is realistically
impossible to completely prevent physical tampering or theft
by determined adversaries. In addition to tamper resistance,
they will be equipped with tamper detection such as tilt
warnings, outage detection, and host-based intrusion detection
which will alert the utility of possible physical tampering.
Impact of loss: It is common practice for utilities to plan for
the possibility of single or perhaps two independent failures
of major components by maintaining sufficient generating and
transmission reserves. A more worrisome scenario is two or
more simultaneous failures of substations, which might be
caused by a malicious attacker. In the current grid, this level of
severe damage could result in a blackout of major metropolitan
areas or multi-state regions for a few hours [35]. Partial power
might be restored by that time but long-term consequences
could be a greater vulnerability to additional blackouts. If
the damage is particularly critical, full restoration could take
several months.
In the past, the most distressing scenario has been cascading
blackouts where one failure has caused subsequent failures of
other equipment and a breakup of the entire system into islands
in an uncontrolled fashion. A cascading blackout famously
occurred in the northeastern U.S. on August 14, 2003 [36].
It has been difficult to accurately predict the occurrence of
cascading blackouts because of the numerous factors involved.
Readiness of repair: In terms of the response to damages,
the smart grid aims to be a considerable improvement over
the current electric power system with the capability of
decentralized self healing [37], [38]. Self healing involves
sensing faults or disruptions; isolating the problem; sending
alerts to the control system; and automatically reconfiguring
spare resources (e.g., backup paths, alternate energy sources)
to circumvent the problematic components and continue to
provide service. The goal is a rapid recovery time that is not
possible with manual response.
To some extent, critical components already have limited
capabilities to failover to a backup. Failover capabilities are
also well established in computer and telecommunication
systems. However, failover is mostly for isolated components.
Self healing is a more ambitious system-wide concept that
involves coordination and signaling among all parts of the
smart grid. Self healing can respond faster to more severe
damages but the capability must be designed into the fabric
of the smart grid instead of individual components.
B. Cyber Threats
To a large extent, the attention on smart grid security has
been centered mostly on cyber threats instead of physical
threats. There may be several reasons. First, the evolution of
today’s electrical grid into an AMI system introduces an entire
new and unknown dimension of cyber threats in addition to
existing SCADA vulnerabilities [39]–[41]. Second, there is
probably a perception that electronic attacks will be easier
to perpetrate than physical attacks. Physical attacks require
tools and physical presence, while electronic attacks might be
carried out from any computer. Third, the smart meter will
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and home energy management systems within the HAN. These
interconnections will increase the exposure of the smart grid
to remote threats. Fourth, decades of experience with Internet
insecurity have shown that electronic attacks can be extremely
serious and difficult to counter if adequate prevention and
defenses are not designed into the system from the beginning.
Because cyber security is a broad problem, there are differ-
ent ways to view it systematically, for example: information
centric (requirements to protect data flows during transmission,
storage, and processing); function oriented (integration of
components into the overall system and their interfaces); or
threat oriented (impacting the common IT security goals of
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability).
A comprehensive list of cyber security threats has been
covered in the literature [10]–[15], [42]–[45]. The major con-
cerns include privacy against eavesdropping and traffic analy-
sis; interference or modification of network communications;
unauthorized access to stored data; masquerade or man-in-the-
middle attacks; service theft; malicious software (particularly
targeted at smart meter firmware or control systems); and
denial of service.
C. Coordinated Threats
Historically, most attacks against the U.S. electrical system
have been relatively isolated and carried out by single attackers
[35]. A single attacker is challenged with collecting all the nec-
essary information and tools to perpetrate a truly widespread
blackout which would require severe damage to three or more
power facilities simultaneously. In the past, groups of attackers
have been willing to bomb power facilities in Europe and
Latin America, the best known example perhaps being the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador.
Coordinated groups can assemble the expertise, manpower,
and equipment to carry out widespread attacks with a severity
beyond the tolerable level designed into the electrical power
system. Today groups of attackers can easily coordinate team-
work across geographies using modern telecommunications
and the Internet.
The problem of coordinated cyber-physical attacks chal-
lenges conventional thinking about system defense. First, a
common defense approach is to identify vulnerabilities that
an adversary might exploit. It is fairly easy to carry out
vulnerability assessment for a system to identify known vul-
nerabilities. However, coordinated attacks might create new
vulnerabilities that have not existed. An obvious example is
a physical attack on a smart meter exposing internal circuitry
that would normally not be exposed. Another example is an
insider with computer authorization to access a substation’s
security system and disable perimeter security, creating an
opportunity for a physical attack. Second, attacks are tra-
ditionally countered by a defense-in-depth strategy in the
belief that an adversary will have to successively overcome
multiple obstacles in order to succeed in an attack. For a
single adversary, this is a reasonable expectation. However,
coordinated attacks could eliminate some of the defenses all
at once.
The first step towards improving smart grid security is better
threat models that take into account the interrelated impact
of physical and cyber attacks. Unfortunately current attack
models used for cyber attacks are not good at recognizing
that cyber attacks can have physical impacts or that physical
attacks can affect the cyber infrastructure. Little is understood
about the composite effects of combined simultaneous attacks.
Moreover, threat modeling for the smart grid is challenged by
the lack of experience with real attacks and the complexity
of the cyber-physical system. Exact attack models may not be
possible at this point but research efforts should be spent on
developing better modeling tools.
IV. PETRI NETS FOR COORDINATED ATTACK MODELING
Petri nets have been widely used to model a variety of
concurrent processes. They are amenable to computer sim-
ulations and mathematical analysis, and well supported by
a variety of software tools. They are a logical choice for
modeling coordinated attacks but have not been investigated
much in the previous literature for cyber-physical attacks. We
first describe the basic Petri net and then illustrate a modeling
example for the smart grid. The basic Petri net can be extended
in various ways, e.g., with colored tokens, timed transitions,
priority transitions [27], [46].
A. General Approach
The basic Petri net is a directed graph consisting of places
and transitions interconnected by directed arcs. In terms of
modeling, transitions represent possible actions (or events);
input places and output places represent pre-conditions and
post-conditions for the action, respectively. The basic opera-
tional rule concerns transition enabling and firing. A transition
is enabled if every input place holds at least one token (i.e., all
pre-conditions are true). An enabled transition may or may not
fire after some time. When a transition fires, tokens move from
the input places to the output places (i.e., the post-conditions
become true). A simple example of an enabled transition T
with two input places and two output places is shown in Fig.
1. If it fires, the tokens at the input places (P1 and P2) will be
removed and tokens will appear at the output places (P3 and
P4). Generally, there could be any number of input or output
places. Optionally, arcs can be assigned weights which are
the number of tokens consumed or created when the related
transition fires, but here all arc weights will be assumed to be






Fig. 1. Transition example
5A Petri net N is defined by N = (P, T, I, O) where P is a
set of places, T is a set of transitions, I is the input function
defining the input places for each transition, and O is the
output function defining the output places for each transition.
For attack modeling, places represent different security states,
and transitions represent the actions of attackers. Concurrent
attackers acting within the same system (and hence same Petri
net) are straightforward to represent by multiple tokens. If the
attackers are different from each other, colored tokens can
account for them.
The general method to construct a Petri net model for
coordinated cyber-physical attacks consists of these steps:
1) enumerate all possible security states of physical and
cyber entities;
2) identify all possible cyber or physical attack actions
affecting changes in security states.
The input places for a transition are the prerequisite conditions
for that attack action, for example, physical tampering of a
smart meter requires that a smart meter is first located and
acquired. The output places for a transition are the outcomes
of the action. The modeling process is straightforward but
requires the security analyst to have extensive expertise in both
physical and cyber security domains. In effect, the modeling
approach does not make any distinction between the physical
and cyber infrastructures nor distinctions between physical and
cyber attacks.
B. Blackout Example
Petri net modeling is illustrated with an example based on a
sequence of events during an historic blackout in midwestern
and northeastern U.S. and Ontario, Canada on August 14,
2003. It began around 4:00 eastern daylight time and lasted
four days. The result was due to an unintentional combi-
nation of several electronic and physical circumstances, not
a malicious attack, but the unfortunate series of events can
be modeled for the purpose of illustration here as an attack
producing the same results. The historic incident serves as an
interesting example because of the intertwining of both cyber
(computer) and physical (power grid) causes.
Fig. 2 shows a Petri net model following the main events
in the timeline from a post-incident investigation [36]. For the
sake of explanation, physical transitions are shown as filled
bars, cyber transitions are empty bars, and half-filled bars may
be physical or cyber. The purpose is to highlight how physical
and cyber events were occurring concurrently but the nature
of the transitions is not important to the Petri net structure.
Initially, the load in Northern Ohio was moderately high,
and two of the region’s power production anchors were already
shut down (P1). FirstEnergy’s Eastlake 5 generation unit
tripped (T1) leading to its shut down (P2). As the unit’s
reactive power output was increasing, the unit’s protection
system detected that the output exceeded the unit’s capability
and automatically tripped the unit off-line. In this model,
transition T1 might be imagined as a cyber attack on the
unit’s control system causing it to shut down. Concurrently, the
alarm and the logging system in FirstEnergy’s control room











Cyber or physical transition
Fig. 2. Petri net model for hypothetical attacks in blackout example
unaware that the electrical system condition was starting to
degrade (P3). Furthermore, the system operators were unaware
that the alarm system was impaired. Imagined as an attack,
transition T2 could represent a stealthy electronic or physical
disabling of the alarm system (which is the reason it is shown
as a half-filled bar).
Next, some of FirstEnergy’s 345-kV transmission lines
began tripping out (T3) due to contact with overgrown trees
causing short circuits to ground. In the actual incident, the tree
contacts were an unintentional combination of environmental
causes, but a physical attack could conceivably have caused
similar short circuits. The loss of these lines resulted in a state
of more load placed on remaining working lines (P4). Due to
the loss of alarms, system operators were not fully aware of
the line trips and the extent of the growing overload situation.
The loss of the 345-kV transmission lines had increased
loading on the underlying 138-kV system serving Cleveland
and Akron, pushing those lines into overload. The overload
caused some 138-kV lines to begin tripping (T4), eventually
leading to a loss of sixteen key 138-kV lines (P5). The loss
of these lines in turn overloaded the Sammis-Star 345-kV line
(T5) causing it to fail (P6). The loss of the Sammis-Star line
and other transmission lines in northern Ohio was the critical
state that triggered a subsequent cascade of failures that spread
far beyond Ohio.
Clearly, the model in Fig. 2 has left out many details but the
purpose of the example is to show how a Petri net model can
capture coordinated attacks in a cyber-physical system. The
cyber and physical infrastructures are vast and complicated in
reality, and a more practically useful Petri net would be much
larger to encompass all of the system components.
V. HIERARCHICAL METHOD TO CONSTRUCT PETRI NET
MODEL
The general modeling method is straightforward but not
scalable to the smart grid. For a vast and complicated cyber-
physical system such as the smart grid, the security analyst
6creating an attack model will be challenged with two daunting
requirements. First, the Petri net model will be enormous in
size to reflect all possible combinations of attacker actions and
their consequences. The required effort to create the Petri net
in a single step will become impractical. Second, the security
analyst (or team of analysts) must be deeply knowledgable
about both cyber and physical threats. It might be feasible
for a small system but again the size and complexity of the
smart grid makes this knowledge difficult to collect and fuse
together.
Our objective here is a more practical method to construct
a large scale Petri net attack model appropriate for the smart
grid. Instead of constructing an immense Petri net in one
step, our method is based on the presumption that small
detailed attack models can be created separately by different
security domain experts. For example, one domain expert
may be knowledgable about physical attacks on smart meters,
while another has expertise on cyber attacks on substations.
Domain experts have a detailed understanding of threats within
their separate specialized but limited fields. The challenge is
automating a process to combine the separate detailed Petri
nets into an unified model. In our construction method, the
process is facilitated by a model description language.
Our model construction method consists of these steps:
1) separate “low level” detailed Petri net models are created
by domain experts for attacks within their areas of
expertise;
2) a “high level” Petri net is created for the system at a high
level of abstraction that includes critically important
(though not all) places but ignores details of transitions;
3) definitions of all places and transitions are created using
the model description language;
4) identical places in the high level and low level Petri nets
are matched;
5) the high level Petri net is expanded with the places and
transitions from the low level Petri nets, matching up
identical places.
Although our method might be called hierarchical because it
proceeds from high level and low level Petri nets, our method
is entirely different from the familiar concept of “hierarchical
Petri nets.” Hierarchical Petri nets consist of a high level
Petri net hiding details of a transition (i.e., a “substitution
transition”), where the details of the substitution transition can
be found in another Petri net (a subpage). Hierarchical Petri
nets are simply a way to present a large complicated Petri net
for easier visual understanding. The correspondences between
the high level Petri net and its subpages are already mapped; a
hierarchical Petri net has already been constructed. In contrast,
we are proposing a construction method. Our method aims
to construct a unified Petri net when the correspondences
between a high level Petri net and low level Petri nets are
not yet established. The correspondences must be found by
matching identical places in the separate Petri nets, which is
enabled by unique logical definitions.
The difficult step in our construction method is how to
recognize that a place P in the high level Petri net is the
same as a place P in a low level Petri net. Places must
be defined uniquely such that the same place appearing in
different Petri nets can be discovered. Clearly, there can be
many possible choices for a model description language. We
suggest an approach similar to the formalism by Braynov and
Jadliwala although they did not frame their work in the context
of Petri nets [34].
The basic idea is that places can be defined as logical
statements of “atomic formulae.” An atomic formula consists
of a variable and its value. Variables represent all security-
related entities in the system and can have predefined possible
values. For example, a variable related to a smart meter could
be outer casing with possible values “intact” or “broken.” An
atomic formula would be a combination of variable and value
that is true for a Petri net place, for example, “outer casing =
intact.” Another variable for a smart meter might be the optical
port with possible values “protected” or “compromised.” A
place is defined by a logical “and/or” statement consisting of
true atomic formulae with the general form:
(variable1 = value1) ∧ (variable2 = value2) ∧ . . ..
For example, a place definition related to a smart meter might
be:
(outer casing = intact) ∧ (optical port = compromised).
This statement defines a specific security state for the smart
meter.
A complete set of variables and their possible values needs
to be created for the smart grid. At present, it is an open
research issue. Given semantics, each place will be defined
uniquely by a logical statement, even when the same place
occurs in different Petri nets.
The definition of transitions is a little more complicated
than places but still straightforward. A transition is defined by
a triplet (action, pre-conditions, post-conditions). The action
is a name describing the attack action. Pre-conditions are the
set of input places that must hold a token in order to enable
the transition. Post-conditions are the set of output places for
the transition. The general form for a transition is:
Transition: < action− name >
:preconditions < list− of − places >
:postconditions < list− of − places >
A. Smart Meter Example
Fig. 3 is an example to illustrate the construction method.
For the sake of explanation, physical actions are shown as
filled bars while cyber actions are shown as empty bars but
the distinction is irrelevant to the Petri net. The example is
not necessarily “typical” but chosen because it includes both
physical and cyber attack actions intermingled in a single
Petri net model. It could be easy to see that different domain
experts may know separate parts of the model in Fig. 3, which
motivates our construction method.
The model shows sequential actions towards ultimately
obtaining cryptographic keys stored in the firmware of a smart
meter (P6). Attackers may buy (T1) or steal (T2) a smart meter
to realize the acquisition of a meter (P1). With a meter in hand,
the physical casing may be broken (T4) to expose the internal
circuitry (P3). The microcontroller or EEPROM holding the
7firmware may be dumped (T6) to read the firmware (P5). If the
firmware is encrypted, it may be cracked (T8) to obtain the
stored cryptographic keys (P6). Alternatively, attackers may
search for an operational smart meter (T3) and identify a target
(P2). Meters typically include an IEC 62056-21 optical port
for field configuration and testing. Bypassing possible physical
protection (T5), attackers may gain access to the optical port
(P4). Typically the port requires password authentication. If
attackers can acquire or crack the password (T7), they may be















Cyber or physical transition
Fig. 3. Petri net example of cyber-physical attack on smart meter
In this example, it is easy to imagine that different domain
experts will be familiar with either cyber or physical attacks,
and no individual expert may know all detailed threats in both
cyber and physical domains. Hence, the domain experts are
assumed to create separate low level detailed Petri net models
for cyber and physical attacks. Fig. 4 is an example of a low
level Petri net created by the cyber attack expert, and Fig. 5







Fig. 4. Low level Petri net models for cyber attacks
The method aims to unite the separate low level models
by starting from a high level model that ignores some places
and details in transitions. The security analyst is assumed to
have a general knowledge about possible attacker actions that
can affect critical security states, but does not have detailed
knowledge about how the attacker actions. The security analyst
creates a high level Petri net model shown in Fig. 6. At this
level of abstraction, the model recognizes that an attacker
may acquire a smart meter (P1) or target an operational smart









Fig. 5. Low level Petri net model for physical attacks
access to the firmware (P5). The transitions in this model





Fig. 6. High level Petri net model
The next step defines all places as logical statements of
formulae consisting of variables and their values. A (not
exhaustive) example set of variables related to smart meter
security might be as listed in Table I. In terms of these
variables, every place in all Petri nets would have a unique
definition consisting of a logical statement of variables and
their values. For example, place P1 represents a condition
where an attacker has simply obtained a non-working, intact
smart meter so the definition would be:
(operation = disconnected) ∧ (physical casing = intact) ∧
(power = off).
After defining all places, the important step in the method
is expansion of the high level model with details incorporated
from the low level models. The step begins by identifying that
places P1 and P2 in the high level Petri net can be found in the
low level Petri nets in Fig. 5. The identification is possible by
comparing and matching the place definitions. Having found
matching places in the two Petri nets, the detailed Petri nets are
drawn into the high level Petri net to create the intermediate
result shown in Fig. 7, where the new details are highlighted
in the dashed areas.
Similarly, place P5 can be identified in the low level Petri
net in Fig. 4. The high level Petri net can then be expanded
further by adding details from the low level Petri net. When
this is done, it may be noticed that places P3 and P4 in the
low level Petri net also match the corresponding places in the
8TABLE I
EXAMPLE VARIABLES FOR A SMART METER
Variables Possible values
Operation Operational; disconnected
Physical casing Intact; broken
Tamper seals Intact; broken
Optical IEC port Protected; accessible
Power On; off
Battery Present; removed
Internal clock Working; errored; failed
Security logs Normal; altered; cleared
Flash memory Protected; accessible
EEPROM Protected; accessible
Firmware Protected; accessible
Stored meter readings Protected; accessible








Fig. 7. High level Petri net model expanded with details
intermediate model of Fig. 7, leading to the composite result
in Fig. 8. In this example, this happens to be the final result
because all details from the low level Petri nets have been











Fig. 8. High level Petri net model
VI. METHOD VALIDATION
A “proof-of-concept” Python program was written to
demonstrate the efficacy of the Petri net model construction
method using the smart meter example in Sec. V-A. The
program takes two inputs: a high level and a low level Petri
net, and creates a new Petri net by merging the details from
the low level Petri net into the high level Petri net. In our
experiments, the program was started with the high level Petri
net in Fig. 6, and run successively with the low level Petri
nets from Figs. 4-5, to create the final Petri net in Fig. 8.
In the program, a specific Petri net model is represented by
a set of arrays: an array P for a set of places, and an array
N for a set of transitions. Each place is defined as a logical
statement, as explained earlier, such as:
(variable1 = value1) ∧ (variable2 = value2) ∧ . . ..
The program uses the 13 variables in Table 1, and within
the program, a logical statement defining each place is
represented by an array of 13 values of the form <
value1, value2, . . . >. Each transition in N is defined by a
pair < PreCond,PostCond > where PreCond is an array
of input places and PostCond is an array of output places for
the transition.
Given a high level and low level Petri net as inputs, the
program first checks if any state definition in the low level
Petri net matches a state definition in the high level Petri net.
If a match is found, the program determines which transitions
in the high level Petri net will be affected by the details in the
low level Petri net. That is, it determines the proper location
in the high level Petri net to insert the details from the low
level Petri net. Next, the program adds state definitions from
the low level Petri net that are not present in the high level
Petri net. In the last step, new transitions from the low level
Petri net are added at the proper place in the high level Petri
net.
Generally, the program carries out straightforward functions.
The most complicated step is the final one where the new
transitions from the low level Petri net are added into the
high level Petri net. Some care needs to be taken to check for
whether transitions from the low level Petri net are duplicated
in the high level Petri net.
The proof-of-concept program was adequate for the small
smart meter example described here but is not sophisticated
enough for complex Petri nets. We have also not considered
possible situations where human errors in the low level or high
level Petri nets might create inconsistencies that could prevent
our method from working correctly. More work is needed to
improve the program and test it for more complex models,
although the initial experiments with the smart meter example
indicate that the method is feasible.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
For smart grid threats, we have argued that Petri nets are
an appealing modeling tool because they offer more flexibility
and expressiveness than traditional attack trees. An example
in this paper shows that Petri nets can be useful for modeling
cyber-physical attacks.The drawbacks of Petri nets are the
expertise and human effort required for large models. For an
enormous cyber-physical system like the smart grid, the usual
modeling approach would be infeasible.
The contribution of this paper is a new method for con-
structing Petri net models for cyber-physical attacks. The
modeling method does not attempt to construct a Petri net
in one step but allows different domain experts to create
9separate Petri nets. The important step of the construction
method unifies the separate Petri nets by making use of a
model description language. With unique place definitions,
correspondences between identical places in separate Petri nets
can be identified and matched. By this process, the details from
low level Petri nets can be transferred and unified into a high
level Petri net, as demonstrated by an example.
The aim of the paper is not an exact model for smart
grid threats, which is impossible at this time due to lack of
experience with real attacks in the smart grid. Instead, our goal
is better modeling tools capable of accounting for sophisticated
attacks on the smart grid which can be useful later when more
knowledge about real attacks is obtained.
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